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Drivers of change or cut-throat competitors?
Challenging Cultures of Innovation of Chinese and Nigerian
migrant entrepreneurs in West Africa 
Dirk Kohnert1
Abstract: The remarkable influx of Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in different West African 
countries in recent years has been met with growing resistance by established local 
entrepreneurs. Whether the former have a competitive edge over the latter because of distinctive 
socio-cultural traits, or whether the Chinese supposed effectiveness is just a characteristic feature 
of any trading Diaspora, is open to question. This exploratory study of Chinese and Nigerian 
entrepreneurial migrants in Ghana and Benin tries to answer this question. Apparently, the cultural 
motive powers of migrant drivers of change are not restricted to inherited value systems or 
religions like a protestant ethic or Confucianism, but they are permanently adapted and invented 
anew by transnational networks of migration in a globalized world. There is no evidence for a 
supposed superiority of Chinese versus African innovative cultures of entrepreneurial migrants. 
Rather there exists an enhanced innovative capacity of a trading Diaspora in general vis-à-vis
local entrepreneurs, regardless of the background national culture in which it is embedded. In 
addition, the rivalry of Chinese and Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs in African markets does not 
necessarily lead to the often suspected cut-throat competition under the impact of globalization. 
Often both groups act rather complementary. This contributes under certain conditions even to 
poverty alleviation in the host country. 
Keywords: Trading Diasporas; international migration, entrepreneurs, culture, innovation, SME, 
Africa, China; Cotonou; Accra; Nigeria
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21. Cultures of Innovation: review of concepts
The upsurge of Chinese migration to Africa in the past decade drew considerable public 
attention already some years ago, largely unnoticed by the outside world. Scholarly 
interest in this phenomenon, which will be summarized below, is of more recent nature. A 
decisive question was (and still is): do these new Chinese migrants constitute the much 
required drivers of change in Africa (cf. Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009)? Intimately related 
to this question is a second one: does there exist any significant difference between the 
innovative drive of Chinese and African migrant entrepreneurs? The comparative study of 
cultures of innovation of Chinese and Nigerian entrepreneurs in Benin and Ghana 
envisaged in this article addresses the general question of socio-cultural roots of 
development and its perpetual adaptation to the actual setting of informal institutions in 
which they are embedded. A holistic understanding of the linkage between culture and 
development is the underlying rational of the concept of Cultures of Innovation, as 
developed by UNESCO (2004), and scholars such as D’Orville (2004) and others (cf. 
Kohnert 2006). Schumpeter’s distinction between ‘innovation’ and ‘invention’ is crucial 
in our understanding of Cultures of Innovation as it focuses on the dissemination and 
implementation process of inventions, driven not just by the strong will of an individual 
charismatic entrepreneur, but stimulated by the economic, political and cultural 
institutional framework of a society as constituent of innovations, i.e. the implementation 
and dissemination of inventions (cf. Schumpeter 1934 [1912]; Swedberg 2002). Thus, 
Cultures of Innovation constitute informal institutions, which are often based on shared 
values or value systems. They fulfill important roles of orientation, motivation, 
coordination, and legitimization regarding the actual performance of innovation processes 
(cf. Heidenreich 2001). The concept provides a methodological framework for the 
delimitation and analysis of elements and strategies of innovative cultural agency. 
Cultures of Innovation depend on space, time and context specific frameworks. They are a 
significant part of multiple modernities, influenced by globalization and transnational 
networks and social spaces (cf. Featherstone 2007; Hahn and Klute 2008; Pries 2001; 
Robertson 1995; Sassen 2001; 2006). Further on, innovative cultures of migrants are 
shaped by the changing requirement of informal institutions in their respective African 
host communities to which they have to adapt in order to survive (cf. Meagher 2007; 
32005). Therefore, due regard must be paid to the fallacies of methodological nationalism 
(cf. Beck 2007; Chernilo 2006).
For our purpose, Cultures of Innovation are defined as relatively stable modes of 
cognition, behavior and social organization, directed towards development2. Notably 
within the framework of African cultures, an unjustified reduction of cultural economics 
to a culture of Western standards of reason and rational choice, against which Stephen 
Marglin and others already cautioned (cf. Marglin 2009: 295-296; Kohnert 2007), should 
be avoided.
Examples of Cultures of Innovation are to be found in different realms: religion is 
obviously one of it, as Max Weber's famous thesis about the protestant ethic as spirit of 
capitalism already suggested. A more recent poof has been provided by a case study of 
new Christian and Islamic movements as modernizing forces behind Nigerian informal 
entrepreneurs (cf. Meagher 2009). Ethnic networks of migrant entrepreneurs or the 
cultural foundations of trading diasporas as drivers of modernization are other examples, 
as demonstrated in another study on Igbo informal enterprise and national cohesion from 
below (cf. Meagher 2009a). Within the field of politics, the sovereign National 
Conferences which mushroomed in Francophone Africa as driving belt of transition in the 
early 1990s represented another innovative culture, although the outcome was not always 
that convincing as in the model-case of Benin (cf. Kohnert 2006). 
Cultures of Innovation of migrant communities are often embedded in the broader 
social setting of 'ethnic entrepreneurship' (Volery 2007: 30-31). However, both concepts 
are clearly distinctive in scope, aim and methodology. The most notable conceptual 
advance of the concept of ethnic or cultural entrepreneurship is the introduction of a 
transnational dimension (cf. Zhou 2004: 1054-60, 1066). The latter suggests that migrant 
entrepreneurs are characterized by a 'mixed embeddedness' in distinctive spheres of 
cultures: their own 'traditional' one, that of transnational migrant networks and of the host 
community, and of formal vs. informal institutions (cf. Volery 2007: 35). This 
transnational dimension has also been underlined in the critique of methodological 
nationalism concerning migration theories (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2008; Wimmer and 
Schiller 2002; Sassen 2006). In any case, trading diasporas, to become effective and 
2 The concept of 'development' in our understanding follows a holistic approach as presented by Amartya 
Sen (2004: 2,3): "In one form or another, culture engulfs our lives, our desires, our frustrations, our 
ambitions, and the freedoms that we seek. The freedom and opportunity for cultural activities are among the 
basic freedoms the enhancement of which can be seen to be constitutive of development." (Sen, 2004:3).
4sustainable, need an ideology, a symbolic blue-print for their organization, as Abner 
Cohen rightly asserts in his seminal publication on the cultural strategies of trading 
diasporas (cf. Cohen 1971). This ideology is most often based on the creation of myths of 
belonging, including rules of rewards and sanctions. All this developed in "a long process 
of trial and error, of cultural innovations and of mediation and symbolic formulation" (cf. 
Cohen 1971: 276).
2. Comparative studies of Chinese and African business cultures in Sub-
Saharan Africa
2.1 Review of literature
The remarkable growth of Chinese-African trade in the past ten years has drawn a lot of 
scholarly attention. Already in 2006, an OECD study envisaged the new Asian giants -
China and India - as growth models for Africa, although it cautioned about possible 
negative effects on resource allocation, governance (rent-seeking) and poverty reduction 
(cf. Lyons and Brown 2009; Goldstein et al. 2006). In 2007, China became the second 
most important trading partner of Africa, just behind the USA and before France (cf. 
Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2009: 45). Most studies focused so far on macro-economic or 
political effects of the circulation of goods and capital on this new 'silk road to Africa' (cf. 
Broadman 2007). The accompanying circulation of labor received less attention. 
Yet, a large-scale immigration of Chinese entrepreneurs into Africa went along with 
the soaring trade figures. Up to one million Chinese flocked into Africa within the past ten 
years, although an exact count of the population is not possible because of the irregular 
status of most immigrants (cf. Lessault and Beauchemin 2009; Mohan and Kale 2007: 9-
10). Undoubtedly, the deregulation of China's emigration legislation and of private labor 
recruitment in the early 2000s out of geopolitical and ideological concern, facilitated the 
outward movement (cf. Mohan and Kale 2007:16). In any case, this influx resulted already 
in a exceedingly visible Chinese presence, particularly in African capitals, and more 
recently also in 'resource frontier zones', e.g. of the oil-rich Niger Delta, the Zambian or 
Congolese Copperbelt, or flanking newly established Chinese 'silk roads' in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Other landmarks of growing Chinese presence are the veritable China-Towns of 
Lagos (cf. Akinrinade and Ogen 2008), Johannesburg or Cape Town. 
5Apparently, the growing Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa 
involved primarily small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are said to be driven by a 
strong entrepreneurial spirit and ethos (cf. Gu 2009: 574). By now, even Chinese 
management consultants for Chinese SMEs tour Africa regularly. Some, like Wang 
Wenning, one of China's most important executive consultants, and incidentally director 
of 'Africa Invest', the only Chinese consultancy firm dealing exclusively with Africa, were 
already envied by their Western peers for their outstanding success (cf. Blume 2008). Up 
to now, most scholarly studies focused on macro or national levels of analysis (cf. 
Broadman 2007; Asche&Schüller 2008). However, to the ordinary public in Africa, 
Chinese presence is most remarkable in the local market, notably in its incorporated form 
as cheap consumer goods, affordable also to the poorer sections of the population, but also 
as Chinese migrant entrepreneurs. A growing number of more recent case studies on this 
development from various African countries are available by now, as will be shown in the 
following. However, a major scholarly question remains unsolved (cf. Mohan and Tan-
Mullins 2009): Could these Chinese entrepreneurial migrants provide an example of an 
innovative spirit which could boost sustainable economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
Do Chinese migrants in Africa act as agents of development, or are they just another facet 
of the plundering of African resources by old and new global players?
Differing answers to this question have been discussed controversially among 
scholars and politicians (cf. Asche and Schüller 2008 for an overview). There are strong 
indicators that African infant industries are deemed to lose from the tremendous growth of 
China's cheap consumer good exports, notably textiles, footwear, and other low-price non 
durable consumer goods. One visible sign was the gradual displacement of clothing 
exports of African countries. (Gu 2009; Sylvanus 2009; Akinrinade and Ogen 2008). This 
has got already negative effects on manufacturing terms of trade of the nascent African 
export industry (cf. Kaplinsky 2008). However, Kernen and Vulliet (2008: 33) maintain, 
based on field studies in Mali and Senegal, that in the majority of African countries 
Chinese goods (still) compete not so much with local products but with competing 
imports, in view of weak nascent local industries. According to them, competition is rather 
between Chinese and African traders importing similar goods from China (pp. 33-36). 
Both trading communities have their own structural advantage. Whereas Chinese traders 
dispose generally over more efficient supply-networks in China, African importers, 
obviously more familiar with local custom and trade enhancing informal institutions,
apparently still guard a competitive edge concerning the distribution network and small 
6retail sale in their home country, notably in the hinterland. According to Dupré and Shi, 
this constitutes a division of labor rather than rivalry between Chinese and local traders in 
the domestic market, at least in Benin and Mali (cf. Dupré and Shi 2008: 38). 
Nevertheless, there is a growing reserve among African stakeholders vis-à-vis this 
remarkable incursion of Chinese migrant entrepreneurs. African trader's associations for 
example increasingly resort to political pressure on their respective national governments 
in order to demand protectionist measures, both against migrants and goods made in China 
(e.g. in Nigeria, Senegal and Togo; cf. Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2009: 52-53; Sylvanus 
2009; Mohan and Kale 2007: 15-16; Akinrinade and Ogen 2008).
However, in what respect and under what exact conditions both groups compete or 
complement one another, and in how far Chinese migrant entrepreneurs are more efficient 
and innovative than their African competitors remains an open question. This will be 
investigated in the following exploratory study based on a review of literature by focusing 
on a small but important part of the universe of Chinese and African trading diasporas in 
West Africa. The example of migrant entrepreneurs in the capitals of Benin (Cotonou) and 
Ghana (Accra), both intimately linked to the regional super-power Nigeria in various 
ways, serves as a first rapprochement to answer these questions: Cotonou, as a transit hub 
for the mainly informal trade with Nigeria, and as a cradle of mushrooming informal 
institutions of both immigrant groups; Accra as an emerging regional sub-power alongside 
Nigeria in Anglophone West Africa. A survey of literature as well as the analysis of data 
available in the Internet on the comparative characteristics of innovation cultures of both 
ethnic migrant communities constitute a preliminary base for further hypotheses 
generation and testing of the hypotheses formulated below. 
The first working hypothesis is that the competition of Chinese and Nigerian 
migrant entrepreneurs does not necessarily lead to the suspected cut-throat rivalry or 
hostility under the impact of globalization in general and in view of the recent worldwide 
financial crisis in particular. Under certain conditions, it may spurn the development of 
specific but complementary cultures of innovation. A strong capacity of adaptation to the 
rapidly changing living conditions and business opportunities in their host country is a 
base for survival and success for both groups of migrants. Nevertheless, according to my 
second hypothesis, their business strategies and modes of survival differ significantly, 
with due regard to the demands of both their home community, the transnational Diaspora 
as well as the host country in that they are meant to integrate. Thirdly, the cultural 
underpinnings of migrant drivers of change are not restricted to, nor necessarily dominated 
7by inherited customs or religions, like the revival of Confucianism (cf. Pairault 2007), 
Pentecoastalism (cf. Kamphausen 2000) or Vodun. They are permanently and creatively 
adapted and invented anew by transnational networks of migration in a globalized world
in order to suit the specific needs of these migrant communities. However, up to now there 
is only scanty evidence available, and if discussed at all in scholarly sources, the issue 
remains debatable. 
The relative performance, success and linkage of business networks of Chinese and 
African entrepreneurs are apparently controversial issues. Nevertheless, most scholars 
agree that the remarkable entrepreneurialism shown by overseas Chinese in Africa (and 
elsewhere) is rather due to their specific networks, adapted to the requirements of 
globalization, and not to cultural characteristics like Confucianism (cf. Mohan and Kale 
2007: 2, 7-8; Ho 2008). In fact, the Chinese Diaspora is not at all homogenous. Although 
there are traits of a common cultural heritage, this fact is overlaid by language and 
regional distinctions (e.g. Canton Chinese versus Mandarin), as well as class, gender, and 
age differences. In addition, "the shift in global capitalism towards 'flexible accumulation' 
has produced complex business networks which exploit increasingly fluid 'comparative 
advantages' of multiple sites" (Mohan and Kale 2007: 8; for Mali cf. Bourdarias, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the economic dynamism shown by this Diaspora is said to wield a 
disproportional impact in Africa, and this much more concerning 'development' in general 
than concerning economic growth (cf. Mohan and Kale 2007: 6; Bräutigam 2003). In 
general, Chinese migrant entrepreneurs have a more pronounced self-esteem as agents of 
modernization and development vis-à-vis their African counterparts instead of the other 
way round (cf. Bourdarias 2009: 18-19, based on a prolonged field study in Mali).
According to Deborah Bräutigam, who did comparative field studies on Chinese 
business networks in Mauritius and Eastern Nigeria, "research on indigenous business 
networks in sub-Saharan Africa suggests that they are less likely than European or Asian 
networks (in Africa) to provide the kind of credit, information, and examples that can 
launch an entrepreneur into manufacturing." This is said to be mainly due to the lack of 
supportive investment policies of African countries and the high degree of informality of 
African trade that is said to limit indigenous networks. Contrary to African business 
networks, Chinese ones "facilitated the ‘flying geese pattern’ of industrialization" 
(Bräutigam 2003: 452, 454-55, 465-66). 
8Based on comparative studies of Chinese and African business cultures in Kenya, 
Alexandra Gadzala (2009: 205-06) maintains as well that Chinese guanxi networks of 
SMEs preserve a competitive edge over their Kenyan counterparts. The manifold ethnic 
divisions of African countries and subsequent cleavages between ethnic groups preclude, 
so it is said, an effective inter-ethnic concertation and the forging of horizontal ties of 
African entrepreneurs. The latter however is said to be typical for Chinese SMEs because 
of its cultural homogeneity, although this hinders the ability to connect with partners 
beyond their immediate networks on the other hand (Gadzala 2009: 206). Because guanxi
networks are based on inter-personal trust within highly circumscribed exclusive 
networks, maintenance of ones own 'face' is said of much greater importance than in 
African networks. Moreover, Chinese trust relations are characterized by the abiding 
nature of long-term obligations, compared to the alleged immediacy generally expected in 
African networks (cf. Gadzala 2009: 205-06). 
Yet, the alleged differences between Chinese and African cultural networks as 
described by Gadzala are questionable. Much of the particularities of distinct guanxi
networks described by her, in actual fact strongly reminds of the long-standing scholarly 
discussion of African ethnic patronage relations too, which are neither primordial nor 
divisive, but continually adapted to modern requirements and guided by a sophisticated 
social fabric of both bridging and bonding, alleviating cross-cultural exchange (cf. 
Meagher 2005: 227). This corresponds with the view of those China Watchers who contest 
that guanxi is something unique to Chinese culture. They rather consider it to be little 
more than a Chinese word for social networks and social capital to be found in the 
informal sector of all developing societies (cf. Gold et al. 2002: 3). In addition, it is by no 
means clear to what extent those guanxi networks are liable to change and if they adapt to 
new local environments (cf. Gold et al. 2002: 4). Nor is it clear how they impact on 
African networks under the prevailing conditions of globalization. This concerns notably 
the question whether a merger of the positive business enhancing aspects of both cultures 
gradually takes place, or whether there exist reinforcing, neutral or negative effects of 
Chinese ventures on African’ business practices (cf. Pratt 2009: 40). 
In a study based on data from the Regional Program on Enterprise Development, 
including Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania, V. Ramachandran and M. K. Shah 
(1999) arrive at the conclusion that overseas Chinese (or Indian) entrepreneurs in Africa, 
start out larger and grow significantly faster than local African firms. They argue that 
Asian minority entrepreneurs dispose of informational and financial networks that provide 
9better access to credit, information, and technology for members of these networks 
compared with their African counterparts. Again anecdotic evidence of the supposed 
superiority of guanxi networks serves as argument for the differential advantage of 
Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa (taking the example of Kenya, cf. Ramachand and Shah 
1999: 74). 
Storey and others suppose on the contrary a cross-cultural diffusion of management 
practices (Storey et al. 2008: 464). In their view, Asian business networks like the guanxi
are bound to mix with similar African cultures in a globalized world. They hold that 
African management has always been largely cross-cultural management out of necessity, 
in view of the rich and diverse cultural heritage of African ethnic groups and their intimate 
historic linkages. Reportedly, the notion of the South African ubuntu for example, 
meaning 'I am who I am through others' serves as indicator of cross-cultural diffusion – in 
contrast to exclusive social networks like the Chinese guanxi, or self-centered credos of 
Western cultures, notably the Descartian doctrine cogito ergo sum or Smithsonian 
economics that focus on the supposed benevolent macro-economic impact of individual 
egoistic actors. Although the concept of ubuntu is not known in all parts of Africa, similar 
visions of communal humanism exert a strong appeal for advocates of a multi-cultural 
African renaissance (Storey et al. 2008: 464). However, Claire Adida cautions against 
premature hypotheses of easy cross-cultural exchange among different ethnic groups with 
similar cultural traits. Based on fieldwork among Nigerian immigrants in Accra and 
Niamey, she concludes that too close cultural similarities between immigrants and host 
society rather worsen immigrant-host relations and social integration. Host country 
citizens tend to reject those migrants they fear will easily blend in and compete all the 
better for scarce resources (cf. Adida 2008). 
3. Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in West Africa: drivers of change? 
3.1 Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in Ghana
Chinese migration to Ghana has a long history. It started already in colonial times and 
blossomed during the early days of Ghana's independence when Chinese citizens, mainly 
from Hong Kong, were lured by the Nkrumah government and its promise of a flourishing 
economy of an English speaking Commonwealth member (cf. Ho 2008a: 9-10; Ho 2008: 
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55-56; Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009: 598). As elsewhere in Africa, however, the 
substantial influx of mainland Chinese only began in the late 1990 for reasons mentioned 
already above. Nowadays, there live between 6,000 and 20,000 Chinese in Ghana, mainly 
in the coastal urban areas of Accra, Tema and Takoradi (cf. Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009: 
591)3. For most Chinese migrants, moving abroad signified progress and modernity, 
because they wanted to distance themselves from cultural practices, traditions and politics 
at home, thought to be at cross with an enlightened (Western) imagination of modernity, 
shared by these migrants. But the recent rise of China as major global player, applying as 
well the rules of global capitalism, could convince them to consider returning home 
eventually. They may take it as an indicator that China's 'anachronistic' values are 
beginning to fade out (Ho 2008: 52-53). This newly opened option for circular migration 
should still enhance the propensity to migrate to Africa. 
However, the innovative drive of the first waves of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants 
in Ghana up to the 1980s, focusing on the manufacture and service sector, was already 
beyond question. These migrants were true global acting entrepreneurs. They were keenly 
aware of, and switching between temporary lucrative business opportunities and 
facilitating national policies, including (illegal) foreign exchange transactions, as shown 
by detailed case studies by Conal Ho, which can not be presented here because of lack of 
space (cf. Ho 2008: 57-71). These cases demonstrate at the same time that individual 
innovative agency and profit orientation does not necessarily contribute to the wealth of a 
nation, as Adam Smith thought. 
Whether the new wave of overwhelmingly small-scale Chinese entrepreneurs in 
Ghana shares the same innovative drive is an open question. Certainly, the massive inflow 
of FDI and the growth of Chinese imports in Ghana already mentioned, was also 
beneficial for them. But in the meantime, the business climate in Ghana had changed 
considerably, among others because the legal framework for expatriates became more 
restrictive, competition grew stronger, and disposable resources of the newcomers were 
considerably lower than in the past. All together impacted also on the effectiveness of 
their own trading networks, last but not least because of heightened suspicion of Chinese 
migrants vis-à-vis outsiders – even of their own country – in view of the class divide 
between different networks of Chinese immigrants and the informal business transactions 
in which most of them were entailed (cf. Ho 2008: 60-61). 
3 Most of them work under irregular conditions, which is why more exact estimates are not available. 
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If one would belief the local media, especially the Ghanaian tabloid press, most 
Chinese entrepreneurs in Ghana are involved nowadays – certainly to a differing degree -
in irregular activities. Notably in illegally retailing, which is apparently often covered by a 
shop fronted by a Ghanaian counterpart (cf. Liu 2010:193, 196). In recent years, Chinese 
entrepreneurs also entered small-scale gold mining, locally known as galamsey. Small-
scale mining was legalized in 1989 by the small-scale mining law. However, 95 percent of 
it remained informal activities in which an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 workers, mostly 
Ghanaian but also foreign, earn their living, notably in the Western Region. Chinese gold 
miners, sometimes backed by local traditional chiefs, entered the trade in providing 
funding and employing heavy equipment for illegal mining operations under the guise of 
providing services to small-scale miners4. This threatened Ghanaian miners who lacked 
the resources necessary to parry Chinese competition5. 
Incidentally, there were by no means only Chinese who violated these regulations, 
major culprits convicted in 2007 came also from Nigeria, India, Germany, Netherlands 
(Baah et al. 2009: 97, fn 10). Yet, beside Chinese traders, Nigerians were actually most 
often targeted by the taskforce of the Ghana Investment Promotion Center (GIPC) against 
illegal retail trading6. In principle, Chinese and other foreign nationals are nowadays 
allowed in manufacturing, the service sector, or wholesaling. In order to protect the 
national labor market, the Ghana Investment Promotion Act of 1994 (Sec. 17 to 19) 
reserves retailing up to a certain volume for Ghanaians only (cf. Baah et al. 2009: 97)7. 
Ghanaian entrepreneurs increasingly complained because of alleged 'dumping'8, e.g. of 
flooding the market with cheap counterfeits made in China, of transferring investments in 
manufacture contrary to the law in trading companies, of transgressing the restrictions for 
4. cf. Adam, Basiru (2009): Ghana: investors turn illegal miners. Public Agenda (Accra), 27 July 2009. -
"Illegal mining: 7 Chinese grabbed", Daily Graphic/Ghana, 9 February 2010; - "Illegal mining deprives state 
of revenue", 27 November 2009, www.graphicghana.com; 23.04.10; - Marfo, Kwame Asiedu (2009): 
Foreigners Take Over Galamsey.  21st August 2009, http://www.graphicghana.com ; 23.04.10. 
5 A similar development has been observed by A. W. Gadzala (2010:  41, 53) in Zambia. 
6 In November 2007 about 200 angry Nigerian businessmen stormed the Joy FM offices complaining about 
unfair closures of their business, which according to them contravened ECOWAS protocols on free trade. 
The Nigeria Union of Traders in Ghana (NUTAG) backed the protest (cf. "GIPC to meet aggrieved traders", 
myjoyonline.com, 11/29/2007; 'Nigerian traders protest application of law", myjoyonline.com, 11/30/2007)
7 The Ghanaian investment code stipulates that foreigners who want to engage in retailing have to register 
with the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) with a minimum capital of US$ 300,000. In addition, 
they should employ at least 10 Ghanaians. In November 2007 the Ghana Union of Traders (GUTA) urged 
members of parliament to review the investment code in order to raise the minimum investment to one 
million US$, and the number of Ghanaians employed to 25 (cf. Kokutse, F. (2008): Ghana: 'You have to 
speak up when competition destroys you'. IPS, 31.07.08). However, nothing changed up to date. 
8 "There were significant complaints about Chinese companies taking their products as well as those of 
Ghana Textile Printing Company (GTP) and dumping them on the Ghanaian market through the 
neighbouring Togolese port at Lomé" (Madichie/Saeed, 2010).
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foreigners concerning retailing, or because of lack of respect of labor rights. The Ghana 
United Traders Organization (GUTA), the representation of Ghanaian retailers and petty 
traders, protested against the alleged impunity of perpetrators and exerted increasing 
political pressure on the Government. Chinese investors in Ghana, on the other hand, were 
concerned about a worsening policy environment (cf. Baah et al. 2009: 98). Other Chinese 
businessmen in Ghana were troubled by 'cultural barriers' of collaboration, e.g. the alleged 
lax work ethic of their Ghanaian laborers or employees who often disappeared without 
permission for funerals, marriages or other family events (cf. Mohan and Tan-Mullins
2009: 596). All these tendencies together might be interpreted as sign for a growing social 
and political confrontation between Chinese and African entrepreneurs.
However, encounters of Ghanaian and Chinese entrepreneurs on the micro-level are 
not at all characterized just by fierce competition, envy or enmity. Relations are shaped to 
a great deal by particular situations and contexts, fluctuating in space and time, as well as 
by real or imagined social boundaries. This has been aptly analyzed by Jing Jing Liu in her 
comparative study of encounters of Chinese and Ghanaian entrepreneurs in Makola 
Market, Accra (cf. Liu 2010). There, innovative drive and 'resourcefulness' is reserved 
neither exclusively to Chinese nor to Ghanaian identities, but ascribed to both, depending 
on the conditions. Under certain perspectives, Chinese traders may view their counterparts 
in a very positive light, notably in comparison with other Africans, even stressing their 
shared work ethic as helpful and hard working humans, when compared e.g. to Kenyans
(Liu 2010:197). On the other hand, Ghanaian small-scale entrepreneurs may feel 
themselves culturally closer to the Chinese, who are not above working and living under 
the same precarious social environment side-by-side with their African counterparts, 
compared with for example Lebanese traders, although the latter may be seen as more 
intimately integrated into their host society (cf. Liu 2010: 196-97).
3.2 Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in Benin
Chinese entrepreneurs, workers and academics have been present in Benin already for 
about three decades. This has been interpreted as a side effect of good diplomatic relations 
between Peking and the Marxist government of Mathieu Kérékou (1972-1989)9. However, 
9 "China built the Benin Friendship Stadium in 1982, followed two years later by the Manucia factory for 
making cigarettes and matches. From May 1987 to April 1993, China and Benin were partners in the 
Associated Benin Textiles Industries (SITEX). [In November 2004, SITEX was declared bankrupt and 
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as elsewhere, the boom of Sino-Benin business relations started only about ten years ago. 
According to informed estimates, just some 700 Chinese lived in Benin in the early 1980s, 
but their number increased to 1,000 in 2.000 and more than 2,700 in 2004.
In the early 2000s, China became the second biggest trading partner of Benin (after 
Nigeria and France, cf. Mounmouni 2010: 35). In 2008, it accounted for 40 per cent of its 
imports and about 21 per cent of exports (mostly cotton; cf. EIU-Benin country report Jan. 
2010: 22). Chinese imports to Benin (740 m. US$) surpassed that to Ghana (660 m. US$) 
already in 2005 (cf. Chaponnière 2006: 5). However, most of these imports were re-
exports directed towards the big Nigerian market. Cotonou has been an international trade 
hub, notably for Nigeria (but also for land-locked neighboring Sahelian countries) at least
since the times of the Nigerian import substitution and indigenization policies in the 1970s 
and 1980s (cf. Igué/Soule 1992). Benin is renowned as a model of trans-border parallel 
trade in Africa. Already in the 1980s, the latter was portrayed as indigenous solution and 
popular resistance to bad governance even by World Bank reports – inspired by the liberal 
doctrines of global free trade - although its development effects have been always 
controversial (cf. Meagher 1997). Growing popular resentment against Chinese traders in 
Nigeria in the 2000s reinforced this kind of trans-national shadow economy. The Nigerian 
state resorted to non-tariff trade barriers, including import restrictions and the (temporary) 
closure of the China Town in Lagos in 2006 (cf. Ogen 2008: 93, 96) because of alleged 
harmful practices of counterfeiting, smuggling and 'dumping' of low-priced or unfit 
consumer goods 'made in China' on the Nigerian market. These measures made re-exports 
– including large-scale smuggling from Cotonou − even more attractive, not only for 
inventive Chinese traders10. Enhanced personal security for expatriate businessmen in 
Cotonou, as compared with Nigerian cities, like Lagos or Port Harcourt, which are 
notorious for a high rate of violent crime, was another reason for preferring cross-border 
closed. Only thanks to massive government involvement and BOAD funding, it resumed production but 
under-capacity, D.K.]. China also built the Lokassa hospital for them in 1997." (Lafargue, 2005: 1). – These 
early investments were complemented more recently by the impressive large building of the Centre chinois 
de développement économique et commercial (Ccdecb) in Cotonou (quartier Ganhi, inaugurated in 
December 2008 by the head of state Boni Yayi), the Confucius Institute at University of Abomey-Calavi in 
Benin, inaugurated in September 2009, the Centre Culturel Chinois in Cotonou (actually the first centre in 
Africa, founded already more than twenty years ago in 1988), and the Chinese University Hospital in 
Parakou (provincial capital of Northern Benin) under construction.
10 "Unrecorded cross-border trade of Chinese goods between Benin and Nigeria appears to be a major 
enterprise, employing thousands on both sides of the border. [Interview with Bashir M. Borodo, president of 
MAN (Manufacturers Association of Nigeria) Kano, March 2009]. The unrecorded trade also presents 
lucrative rent opportunities for corrupt officials on both sides of the border, which is one reason why 
smuggling has continued despite repeated official declarations of intent to bring it to a halt. [Interview with 
Nigerian journalist, Lagos, March 2009]". (cf. Mthembu-Salter, 2009: 11). 
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trade with Nigeria (cf. Dupré and Shi 2008: 20). Only 36 percent of Chinese migrant 
entrepreneurs in Cotonou, interviewed by Dupré and Shi (2008: 29) in 2008, confirmed to 
focus their activities on the local or national market of Benin (compared with 80 per-cent 
in Mali). A sample survey of Chinese migrants in Benin, conducted in early 2008 by 
Mathilde Dupré and Weijing Shi (Sciences Po, Paris), contained first detailed descriptive 
information on Chinese migrant entrepreneurs on the micro-level (cf. Dupré and Shi 
2008). 
The Chinese Diaspora in Benin is not at all homogenous, even if its members 
maintain cordial terms among one another. They demonstrate an astonishing capacity of 
adaptation to local conditions in spite of the apparent language problems. Their stalls or 
shops are often situated side by side with that of local African traders, and many Chinese 
shop owners even lodge in their working place or close to the neighborhood (cf. Dupré 
and Shi 2008: 14-18). The difference in culture and language nevertheless remains a 
problem, although many Chinese migrant entrepreneurs try to speak French (about 80 
percent) or even Fongbé (about 23 percent), the vernacular of Southern Benin. Chinese 
employers of local labor often deplored the low level of education and lack of professional 
rigor of their African employees, whereas the latter complained about closeness, lack of 
trust or bad labor relations (cf. Dupré and Shi 2008: 34). According to G. Mounmouni, 
Chinese employers in West Africa (and elsewhere) practice a traditional minded top-down 
approach of management, characterized by massive prerogatives towards African workers: 
They are assumed to be lazy, lack ambition and need to be controlled and coerced to 
deliver their maximal effort; this apparently applies also to Benin. As a consequence, most 
Chinese managers miss many possibilities to make good use of the potential of creativity 
and engagement of their local African workforce (cf. Mounmouni 2010: 29). However, 
whether this traditionally minded attitude applies also to small-scale Chinese migrant 
entrepreneurs, who mostly employ just family labor, and only if needed an African 
counterpart, or one to two additional local workers, is open to question.
On the other hand, as overall in Africa (cf. Sylvanus 2009), entrepreneurs from 
Benin complain about the alleged 'disloyal' competition of the Chinese made cloth 
(including illegal copying of designs), made responsible for the ailing textile industry. 
Many Benin entrepreneurs see this as an anachronism in view of the fact that their country 
is the second largest cotton producer in Sub-Saharan Africa. Certainly the crash of two 
major textile factories SITEX and CBT at Lokossa, both joint ventures of Benin and 
China, mismanaged and incapable to withstand the pressure of cheap imports of Chinese 
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clothes, intensified these fears11. This is why Benin businesspeople consider China both as 
a "predator and partner of Benin's textile industry" (cf. Mounmouni 2010: 37). Many 
vendors of textiles on Cotonou's large international Dantokpa market are as well at cross 
with their Chinese (and Pakistani) competitors who also engage in retailing12. Notably, 
because they allegedly import Chinese made counterfeits of textile trade-marks, such as 
Vlisco, Super Wax or Mandras, or smuggle textiles from neighboring Togo (cf. 
Mounmouni 2010: 35)13. Another concern was the increasing smuggling of timber to 
China, cut illegally and thus contributing to the unsustainable deforestation of Southern 
Benin. Although the Government of Yayi Boni suspended timber exports in the meantime, 
some Chinese from Cotonou are allegedly still engaged in this irregular trade, taking 
advantage of the porous frontier with Togo (cf. Mounmouni 2010: 37).
Nevertheless, as elsewhere in Western Africa, the division of labor between Chinese 
and African entrepreneurs in Benin is rather complementary than competitive. Whereas 
the Chinese profit from lower transaction costs for the import of goods, e.g. because they
are inserted in more performing business networks in China, their African counterparts 
dispose more efficient distribution networks on the demand side, notably in retail trade 
and in the countryside (cf. Dupré and Shi 2008: 38). 
4. Nigerian Migrant Diasporas in West Africa: Agents of Change?
Nigerians (estimated at about 150m in 2008) account for more than half of the total 
population of West Africa. Therefore, it is not surprising that the country has a long and 
dynamic emigration history. Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba long-distance traders from regions 
which nowadays constitute Nigeria played a decisive role in the trans-regional networks of 
migrant entrepreneurs since pre-colonial times all over West Africa (cf. Meillassoux 1971; 
Cohen 1971; Forrest 1994). Most of the international migration in the sub-region is 
11 Dossa, Colbert (2010): Le textile Béninois dans l’impasse: Vers la disparition totale du tissu béninoi.. 
Journal Dignité Féminine 21/03/10; L'@raignée - presse, http://www.blesshnet.com/heberg/laraignee ; 
accessed: 29.04.10. 
12 Retailing was practically forbidden to foreign traders under the Marxist Kérékou regime (1972-89) in 
order to create employment and to protect local petty traders. After economic liberalization, introduced by 
the new parliament subsequent to the democratic transition in 1990, all discriminatory measures between 
national and foreign traders were annulled by law (09-005 Act of 15.05.90). In 2001, because of increasing 
pressure of local textile traders, the government banned again foreign traders from retailing (cf. Mounmouni 
2010: 35).
13 Vidjingninou, Fiacre (2007): Les commerçants béninois digèrent mal la concurrence chinoise. Aujourd'hui 
la Chine, http://www.aujourdhuilachine.com , accessed: 30.04.10. 
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embedded in the informal sector, which causes a lack of exact data on the stock and flow 
of Nigerian migrants in different West African countries. At least case studies of Nigerian 
entrepreneurial migrants are available, e.g. for Benin (cf. Martineau 2009 and below), 
Cameroon (Lawal 2008; Nkene 2003; Weiss 1998), Ghana (cf. Antwi Bosiakoh 2009; 
Adida 2008; Eades 1993; and below), Niger (Youngstedt 2004), and within Nigeria 
(Meagher 2005). They generally attest to an astonishing capacity of adaptation and 
integration as well as a remarkable propensity for change and innovation, as will be shown 
in the following examples of Ghana and Benin.
4.1 Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs in Ghana
The first wave of Nigerian immigrants in Ghana was attracted by gold and diamond 
mining in the 1920s, and later on by the growth of the cacao cash crop economy, but also 
by a common colonial language and other cultural similarities. According to a Ghanaian 
census of 1948, about 46,800 Nigerians lived in Ghana; their number rose to 100,000 in 
1959 (cf. Afolayan et al. 2008: 10) and 300,000 in 196914 (Eades 1993: 1). However, most 
of the entrepreneurial migrants had to leave in 1969 because of restrictive immigration 
laws introduced by the Ghanaian government, as will be explained in more detail below. 
According to World Bank estimates, there lived some 56,000 Nigerians in Ghana at the 
end of the 1980s 15, a total that tripled again in the past two decades. According to joint 
estimates of the World Bank and the University of Sussex, the stock of Nigerian migrants 
in Ghana is at present about 160,00016. 
The history of Yoruba immigration to Ghana is probably one of the best documented 
case studies of the growth and (sudden) decline of a Diaspora of enterprising Nigerians in 
Africa: Between the first and second World War 
"groups of enterprising Yoruba traders from a few towns in Western Nigeria had 
established a remarkably successful trading network throughout the Gold Coast 
(Ghana). Using information, skills and capital generated mainly within the family, 
14 Out of a total of an estimated 300,000 persons of Nigerian origin in Ghana in 1969, 150,000 were Yoruba, 
92,400 Hausa and 21,000 Igbo (cf. Eades, 1993: 200, fn.1).
15 Cf. Table 1 in: "Atlas on regional integration in West Africa", ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD, 2006:12; 
http://www.atlas-ouestafrique.org/spip.php?article55 .
16 cf. World Bank 2009, website: http.//econ.worldbank.org/…; Table 1: Bilateral estimates of migrant 
stocks.
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what grew to become the largest groups of immigrant traders in the country had 
spread to even the most remote rural areas, becoming a powerful force in the 
Ghanaian markets." (Eades 1993: cover text). 
However, the domination of central institutions of Ghana's trade by these 'Lagosians', as 
Yoruba immigrant traders were commonly called in Ghana, was met by growing 
resentment against strangers. The latter culminated in the "Alien Compliance Order" of 
1969 that ordered all irregular migrants to leave Ghana at short notice. Thus, almost all of 
the 150,000 Nigerian Yoruba living in Ghana at that time were expelled within two weeks 
(cf. Eades, 1993: 1, 196, 200).  
Eades' account 'from below' of Nigerian Yoruba entrepreneurs, both men and 
women, in Northern Ghana is most illustrative. It highlights that these immigrants were 
quick to respond to new economic opportunities and incentives, even in remote areas and 
in most unusual settings over a period of six decades. Many of them draw value from their 
own resources, relying extensively on low cost family rather than wage labor, and created 
flourishing enterprises, without demanding public subsidies. In short, they were inventive 
agents of change, pursuing development strategies, although they were certainly focused 
primarily on their own benefit (cf. Eades 1993: 107-139,196). 
Nigerian migrant associations, which are most often intimately related to their place 
of origin, played a central role in the orientation of their members, in organizing and 
improving their livelihood, and in facilitating their integration into the host society. As a 
rule, these trans-national social networks did not aim explicitly at enhancing economic 
development. Yet, they became, in the pursuit of their social activities, effective 
development agents in Ghana, as demonstrated by a case study of Nigerian migrant 
associations in Accra by Thomas Antwi Bosiakoh (2009: 1, 13-14). These migrant 
associations could be regarded as an expression of a specific culture of innovation of 
entrepreneurial Nigerian migrants in Ghana, which gave them a competitive edge vis-à-vis
their Ghanaian competitors. However, those hometown associations are no specific 
Nigerian cultural strategy of the organization of trading diasporas. They are common to 
other African, or even Chinese migrant entrepreneurs.
However, the agenda and vision of development of Nigerian migrants did not always 
match with that of the Ghanaian state or of the ruling power elite, as the expulsion of 
'aliens' in 1969 demonstrated. The general cultural proximity of Nigerians compared with 
Ghanaians may have added to growing hostility between Nigerian immigrants and their 
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hosts, because the latter feared that this closeness could make them redundant even more 
easily, as Claire Adida suggests (Adida 2008). Political pressure of interest groups for the 
exclusion of foreigners in the 'national interest' is nothing new, but apparently it celebrates 
a revival with the spread of a new nationalism all over Africa (cf. Kohnert 2007).
4.2 Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs in Benin
The presence of Nigerians in Benin dates back to pre-colonial times when the Yoruba 
kingdom stretched over territories, which were later on divided by colonial frontiers 
between French Dahomey and British Nigeria. Although the colonial powers tried to 
restrict trans-border trade as far as possible for particular reasons, it never ceased, 
although it became illegal. After the Second World War, Nigerian migrants settled mainly 
in the urban centers of Cotonou and Porto Novo, the economic and political capitals 
respectively of Dahomey (renamed Benin in 1972). The exact number of migrants is not 
known. Nowadays, estimates of Nigerian migrants in Benin (in 2005) range from 51,780 
to 205,512 (cf. Martineau 2009: 243). 
Most immigrants remained closely attached to their hometown identity. 
Nevertheless, cultural strategies to integrate themselves into the host society differed 
significantly according to ethnic group and respective political conditions. Whereas 
migrants from the Nigerian town Offa, who for example choose to live in Cotonou, 
preferred to become Benin citizens, the migrants from Oyo, Ede or Ibadan, choose to 
remain Nigerian, although many of them lived already for generations in Dahomey/Benin 
(cf. Martineau 2009). In any case, the strong symbolic relation of the Yoruba trading 
diasporas in Benin with their ancestors' hometown constituted a distinctive cultural trait 
which contributed to the innovative drive of Nigerian entrepreneurial migrants, similar to 
that of their counterparts in Ghana mentioned before. This has been aptly demonstrated by 
a recently published case study of Nigerian trading diasporas in Benin by Jan-Luc 
Martineau who underlines once more the crucial fact that the cultural identity of these 
trans-national social ethnic trading networks is permanently adapted to the actual needs of 
all concerned (cf. Martineau 2009). At the same time, competing ethnic networks of the 
Benin Yoruba jealously watched any move of their Nigerian counterparts that could 
endanger their claim to the right of the first-comer and rightful owner of the cultural 
heritage of their nation. 
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5 Articulation of trading diasporas' innovative cultures in West Africa
Do Chinese entrepreneurial migrants in Africa outperform African trading diasporas in 
relation to individual economic success or even concerning their impact on development? 
Do there exist significant differences in the innovative drive of either group, and if so, what 
are its underlying reasons? Do specific cultural traits of Chinese migrant networks favour 
their economic competitiveness compared with African cultures? Or is the supposed 
effectiveness of Chinese migrant entrepreneurs, admired by some groups and envied by 
others, just a characteristic feature of any trading Diaspora? Are its members perhaps more 
inclined - or forced, according to circumstances - to be innovative drivers of change, if only 
in order to survive in a foreign, sometimes even hostile social environment? After all, 
economic migrants are perceived by most people worldwide as more enterprising and 
adventurous fellows than the ordinary human being that stays at home to earn its living.
Next to nothing is known about the relationship of Chinese and African 
entrepreneurial diasporas in their common host countries, let alone on the articulation of 
their cultures of innovation. This question is still terra incognita, awaiting meticulous 
empirical investigation. In the meantime, we have to rely on more or less founded 
anecdotic evidence and speculation. Both groups are perceived by their local competitors, 
and increasingly by the national tabloid press, as strangers, if not intruders. In view of 
increasing xenophobe tendencies of the politics of belonging in Western Africa, it makes 
apparently little difference whether they live already for generations in their host country 
and have acquired its nationality, like Nigerian migrant traders in Benin. Possibly, the latter 
profit from close cultural similarities with the local population, notably if they belong to the 
same or related ethnic groups as the Nigerian Yoruba in Benin. This may facilitate among 
others the entrance into or collaboration with networks of ethnic entrepreneurs – not 
necessarily of the same ethnic group - of their African host community. At least, case 
studies about Igbo entrepreneurial migrants and their links with Hausa and Yoruba migrant 
traders in Nigeria, characterized by longstanding relationships of trust and cooperation (cf. 
Meagher 2009), point in this direction. On the other hand, Adida (2008) maintains that too 
close cultural identities rather arose suspicion and rejection by local rivals. In short, it is by 
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no means certain that African migrants get a general premium in local estimation vis-à-vis
Chinese migrants just because of their Africanity. After all, African identity is a social 
construct, periodically invented and adapted anew according to circumstances and needs. 
Thus, Benedict Anderson's (1991) renowned concept of the imaginaries of Nationalism as 
invented community applies to the notion of Africanity as well. It even stretches beyond 
people and includes the identity of goods as well, as Nina Sylvanus (2007) aptly 
demonstrated, taking the example of Chinese made counterfeit 'African-wax' cloth in Togo. 
If all boils down to the question of cultural differences, we may be inclined, in view 
of the paucity of data on the articulation of Chinese and Nigerian entrepreneurial diasporas,
to take as an approximation the relationship of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants in Nigeria 
with their local counterparts. A few case studies have already been made in the latter field 
(cf. Ogen, 2008; Atomre et al. 2009; Obiorah et al. 2008; Kitching and Woldie 2004). 
They all point in the same direction, namely that there are no robust indicators that prove 
distinctive cultural factors specific to either Chinese or Nigerian culture as a whole, 
independent from space and time, which could explain its different performance. Quite to 
the contrary, it has been shown above that Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs in Ghana have 
been over decades at least as performing as Chinese migrants nowadays. But even if such 
unique national innovation cultures do exist in their respective home country, this would 
not necessarily mean that they act in a similar way under foreign conditions, e.g. uprooted 
and transplanted in trading diasporas acting in a foreign cultural environment, far away 
from their customary cultural home. 
Alternatively, we could investigate as a second proxy for the articulation of Chinese 
and Nigerian entrepreneurial diasporas, the relationship of Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs 
in China with their local Chinese counterparts, which is just the inverse of the first proxy. 
In fact, there is an increasing number of African, notably Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs 
in China17. The few available studies on this relative new phenomenon (cf. Bertoncello 
and Bredeloup 2009: 55-60; 2007; Rennie, 2010; Onos, 2009) again do not deliver any 
clues about the superiority of a national Nigerian (or Chinese) innovation culture, although 
in this respect guanxi networks have been mentioned again as peculiar Chinese cultural 
17 According to informed estimates there live actually between 20,000 and 120,000 Africans in the 
Guangzhou region alone. Again reliable data are lacking because of the irregular status of most African 
migrants (cf. Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2009: 55).
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trait to be observed by African entrepreneurs (cf. Horwitz et al. 2005), a notion which is 
highly controversial, as explained above. 
In short, in order to a make a methodically sound comparison of different ethnical 
groups of migrant entrepreneurs and to discern eventually their distinctive innovative 
cultures, it will be imperative to make evaluations on a level playing field. This is, both 
ethnic trading diasporas should be studied at the same time, implanted in an identical 
foreign environment (host country) to allow for meaningful comparisons, last but not least, 
in order to reduce as far as possible – often unknown external intervening factors. All this, 
to stress it again, should be done with due respect to the trans-national social spaces in 
which these migrant networks are embedded. Assessing and isolating the impact of 
Cultures of Innovation on development becomes even more difficult in view of possible 
counteracting influence of other significant factors. The most significant one is probably 
the global trend for neo-liberal economic and political reforms in the past decades by the 
international donor community, combined with state neglect notably in Africa, which both
shape the performance of entrepreneurial networks in complex interactions (cf. Meagher 
2010: 166).
6 Conclusion
Chinese and African entrepreneurial diasporas are culturally distinct from their society of 
origin as well as from that of their host community. A strong capacity of adaptation to the 
rapidly changing living conditions and business opportunities – not just in their host 
country but on a global scale - is a precondition for success for both groups of ethnic 
entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, their business strategies and modes of survival differ 
significantly, with due regard to the demands of both the host country and the respective 
transnational Diaspora in that they are embedded. Although most of these entrepreneurial 
diasporas are not as homogenous as thought off at first sight, but characterized by 
significant divisions according to class, gender and even ethnic composition, they more 
often than not develop their own distinctive culture. This common culture is not just an 
ideology which welds together a moral community (cf. Cohen, A. 1971: 266-67), i.e. a 
culture of identity acting as a kind of glue for the different factions of the Diaspora, to 
bridge or hide their internal divide. Under certain conditions it also becomes an enabling 
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culture of innovation that provides its members with a distinctive drive for change and 
modernization. This may include a remarkable capacity for institutional innovations across 
kinship and community frontiers, similar to that observed by Kate Meagher in her study of 
Igbo entrepreneurial networks and their liaison with other ethnic trading diasporas, 
contributing to a nation-building 'from below' in Nigeria (cf. Meagher 2009: 35). 
However, this seems to be no unilateral path-dependant development, let alone a planned 
process, but the result of a long path of trial and error. Further more, although most 
cultures of trading diasporas have a distinctive creative impetus which stimulates 
ingenuity, change and an entrepreneurial spirit, not all of them are at the same time 
innovative, i.e. embedded in social processes and networks that effectively disseminates 
particular inventions. And even if so, they are not necessarily development orientated in 
the sense mentioned above.  
Notwithstanding, a growing divide of current Chinese entrepreneurial diasporas (or 
of Nigerian entrepreneurial migrants in Ghana in the 1960s) on the one hand, and their rival 
groups of local entrepreneurs on the other, instigated by the identity politics of a new 
nationalist elite keen to consolidate its power and resources, there is a long-standing 
effective collaboration at the grass-root level between the different trading diasporas. The 
latter is based on a division of labor and on the comparative advantage of the innovation 
cultures of each group. Last but not least, this contributed also to nation wide poverty 
reduction, notably in providing cheap basic consumer goods even to the most remote 
corners of the hinterland. 
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